Comments

Good briefing paper and article, Ashlee and Stephen. The ongoing absence of a specialised committee/sub committee to undertake inquiries (and receive briefings) on aid is a long term oversight. I worked on the Inquiry into Australia's policy in the Pacific around 2007, which was held under the auspices of the JSCFADT Human Rights Sub-Committee, and i don't think Human Rights was really a good fit. A roundtable inquiry process was held into cross-border health challenges by the Health and Ageing Committee a few years ago, which was interesting given that it really cut across aid and domestic health issues. For those working in the aid and development sector, engaging with Parl Committees is often an unclear process - requests to provide briefings are muddied by not knowing exactly who one should be asking to brief. Elevating aid in the committee system would be appropriate given the quantum of Australia's aid program, and would to an extent assist with creating more engagement between development players and parliamentarians. With the new Govt shaking things up, and at least rhetorically upping the ante on discussions around accountability and effectiveness, now's a good time to be raising these issues and one would think a separate aid sub-committee would be attractive to them. In my opinion, a separate sub-committee under JSCFADT would be the way to go - it would certainly be in line with the Govt's focus on aid falling squarely in the realm of foreign policy. If they went this way, they might consider creating a new 'aid inquiry secretary' role as well, hopefully bringing in someone who has a background in aid and knows the sector (with the added benefit of creating one opportunity in what could be an increasingly crowded development job market...)

I am not very sure about the 1999 cyclone I know only as much as you mentioned here. Considering just the Phailin, IMD could predict it 4 days before the cyclone hit. This gave the administration to take up necessary steps, even though not perfect, it has responded quite well. We may not have the same luxury every time. There was a cloud burst in Uttaranchal,during which the government could not respond effectively, it would be no exaggeration to say government has hardly responded. A country cannot rely on measures like these. It should try to ensure quality in construction, laws have to be made and enforced. Government has to effectively integrate these efforts with several social schemes such as IAY, MGNREGA etc. On top of all this developing countries should enhance the capabilities of their citizens in coping with such diasters!!

Thank you for sharing the story of your struggle to get a formal education and to determine your own life. It was very moving to read. My wish is that more PNG children are able to have more choices about how their lives will be via the path of a good education.

Over the past five and a half years I have liaised with AusAID staff on funding and program delivery. The partnership model implemented and the exchange has been professional and produced very positive outcomes. Monitoring and evaluation, value for money and overall measuring success occupies a space of qualitative outcomes which has evolved with global imperatives. The amalgamation of AusAID and DFAT will likely result in a cross pollination of values, systems and organisational culture. Integrity, empathy and accountability are worthy professional values to uphold. The up and coming graduates seeking work in the foreign affairs and international development fields will be provided with opportunities in a stronger and united outward looking organisation representing Australians and Australia's interests in the international sphere.

Thanks for the insights. Without any backing of research, my friends in Nias are also very disappointed with outcomes in economic development planning. I have just started an initiative with University of Canberra looking across the adaptations professions make and should make for more effective recovery, and economic planning and livelihoods is an area of priority, but so far I have no traction on where to take my initiative. A chat with you would be most valuable.

Thanks Robin for a great comment on the change. It's important that we understand it. I'm not so optimistic that the DNA can be changed. The elephant in the room is the difference in this dimension that you raise - culture/personality. AusAID and DFAT both do important things but they are vastly different things. The AusAID poverty focus was something relatively recent in a coherent sense. It felt like an important point in the evolution of the aid program. It's gone I think. For now. I really feel for AusAIDers. We've lost a lot. I'm sure there are smart people working out what next but I still worry.

A very good piece indeed. Having joined AusAID as local staff in Zimbabwe where the organization has been able to achieve results in a difficult political environment one reaches a point of great sadness when the future is uncertain. Not so much for the possibility of losing jobs, but on thinking how and whether this new arrangement will work. Just wondering whether we have embarked on a journey where we are taking two steps back in order to take one step forward or vice versa. All remains to be seen. I hope that not much time will be spent getting the new structures perfect while losing the momentum that the aid program had gained in these parts of the world.

Interesting post! this article is good in terms of ideas. for the people who are starting up their individual career, this topic can be their guide towards their own path.

Robin, Thank you for that excellent eulogy for an organisation that I worked in from almost the very beginning - from those days of the Aid Branch in External Affairs in the early 60’s, through the various changes of acronyms ultimately to AusAID. I can only hope that the professionalism and expertise gained over the decades will not be lost but will enhance that of DFAT. As my mate, Allison Sudradjat was wont to say 'it's the best job in the world'.

Very sad, but useful reading. Thanks for reading the whole document and providing a very good summary. Edward

Echoing the majority of other commenters I hear, I thank you for the piece. Having spent many years working beside and encouraging improvement in Australia's aid program, I too have been encouraged by the knowledge and commitment of so many of its staff. It strikes me, as echoed by Don d'Cruz's consistent comment above, that this move has little to do with improving our aid program further - and is driven purely by ideology. Whilst recognising the success of the supporters of Australian aid who have gained a doubling of the aid program in the last ten years (off a very low base), it seems the quantum of aid debate has filled the always limited public space and left little room for a public discussion about why and how we deliver aid. Focusing on the dollars that go to aid has also evidently wrankled the ideologues like d'Cruz and his friends at the IPA who see this 'integration' as an achievement. There is of course significant opportunity that will come from this change but enslaving our aid dollars to a larger bureaucracy with a much broader agenda, will likely mean a blurrier public perception of what aid does and not a clearer one. It is difficult too, to see how the new FM will acheive her 'genuine performance-based benchmarks' - whatever they may be - with a greatly reduced workforce, a focus on 'trade not aid', a return to 'mutual accountability' (I look forward to the FM laying down the law to FM Natalegawa on what Indonesia's obligations will be) and a PM who can't seem to come to grips with how foreign policy actually works. I thank the staff of AusAID for their achievements and wish them the very best in navigating this personally challenging time that lies ahead. There is little doubt the incredible gains in reducing child mortality, in improving maternal health, in bringing polio to the brink of eradication and the millions of other lives that AusAID has made a positive contribution towards, could never have happened without your dedication, skills and commitment.

Thanks Dr T for your insight. I think your views about SI governance are especially valid, considering your status as an elite Solomon Islander with a broad worldview and senior political and managerial experience. And your post is balanced and well-considered, so it probably has far less bias than reports that are commissioned and paid for by any organisation that is the subject of the same report. As you rightly point out (please excuse my paraphrasing), we are all held captive by our own bias (and incentives) when we view the world. In regard to your post, may I humbly refer to an article I read in the past few days… The Professor of Political Science of University of Copenhagen, Vivek S. Sharma very recently published this article controversially entitled, “Give corruption a chance.” Sharma writes about the experience of the Western allies in Afghanistan in the last decade, and what looks like their complete inability to do anything about the raging ‘corruption’ that feeds the Afghani political system. He makes specific mention of “the duffel-bags stuffed full of taxpayer money” that the CIA and the Brits use to prop up Hamid Karzai’s government. I was struck by the argument made by Sharma and its relevance to your two excellent posts (the conceptual equivalency between the duffel-bags of cash, and Taiwan’s funding of the CDF in Solomons, is one of many similarities). Sharma seems to think that the ‘state-building’ project, as it is configured by the international (Western) community, is for the most part an intellectually bankrupt enterprise. Sharma says that, “It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the project of implanting ‘good’ institutions in non-Western societies, whether through conquest (as in Iraq and Afghanistan) or through consensual, noncoercive means (as in Cambodia), has turned out to be a thankless task.” Sharma argues, “it appears that in our modern age there may be no way to use liberal means to attain liberal ends in nonliberal societies.”, and concludes, “in some instances, corruption must be accepted as an undesirable but nonetheless potentially legitimate mechanism for engaging with societies organized along different lines. Perhaps it is time to give corruption a chance.” If one accepts Sharma’s argument about the practical necessity and overwhelming power of informal political transactions (some of which are ‘corruption’) in transitional states, then one must question the very essence of much of the donor-driven capacity-building agenda. Thankfully Sharma provides clues that will lead us out of the cul-de-sac. “In order for the development project to succeed beyond the actual alleviation of human suffering it will have to find ways in which to incentivize individuals—and especially elites (unless we propose to decapitate them, elites are crucial)—to adhere to different standards of public and private conduct. Otherwise, all that will happen is the creation of administrative structures that will be penetrated and permeated by the natural incentive structures organic to the existing society.” If we are compelled by our nature to use reason and logic as our refuge of last resort, then we must treat Sharma’s ideas with respect, even if they lead to personally inconvenient analytical conclusions. It seems difficult to argue against the general contention that RAMSI played a key role in bringing law and order to Solomon Islands after the Tensions. But it also seems equally difficult to argue against the contention that in 2013 most parts of the Solomon Islands state are as weak and lootable as they ever were, and the illegal urban land-grab going on right now in Honiara is just one piece of evidence to support this. I think the big question is why was the former achievable, and the latter not? My hope is that as Solomon Islanders and their development partners move forwards in their quest for inclusive stability and prosperity, the lessons of the past, both convenient and inconvenient, are taken on-board. The hard questions about RAMSI and its operational model may be easier to ask now, rather than a year ago. The worst case scenario is that for all parties concerned every new year is year zero.