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It would be wise to take a closer look at the KANI program. The costs could be greatly reduced if the students didn't have to complete two courses. Firstly they complete a diploma then a degree. This adds a greater amount of stress, exams and time for the students. Many of the students had the capabilities of undertaking a degree but were not permitted for various reasons. As I supported them through the first years there were many issues that contributed to their failure rates. Many related to the institutional processes. I'm sure that an exit point at a diploma level would decrease the costs and would better suit some students however this option does not allow them permanent residence. Their stipend was excessive in the first instance allowing many students to live in one place pooling money that at one point exceeded my wage. So there are many hidden costs to this program and benefits for those involved who enjoyed frequent trips to the Coral Atolls. Needless to say it should not continue under the same format, it definitely needs some changes.

As someone who oversaw the production of this report, I feel compelled to respond to this blog entry. However, I do so in my independent capacity as a scholar, and not on behalf of Jubilee Australia, who will prepare their own response I am sure in the days to come. I appreciate that Dr Wallis has taken the time to read the report and respond to its findings. Moreover, we should all welcome scholarly critique, it enriches the conversation no end. However, for the conversation to be enriched, in my view, certain basic principles of fairness must be observed. Most critically it is not fair to invent a ‘straw man’, and it strikes me that this is what the author has done here. Wallis has fundamentally misrepresented the report’s methods and findings, so it appears to contain brash, unsupported statements, when its aims and methods are much more modest. In order to support this contention I will attempt to faithfully reproduce the author’s criticisms and respond to them in turn. 1. ‘Despite the fact that research for the report only involved interviews with 65 Bougainvilleans and one focus group of 17 individuals residing near the mine site – a fraction of Bougainville’s 300,000 people – their responses are presented as broadly representative’. This is incorrect. The research did not use randomised sampling and so never claims to be representative of a broader population. Its objective was to explore a range of deeply perceptual issues relating to history, heritage, and future. It was a phenomenological study, and there was no base from which to begin. So we selected an exploratory case study method, using a combination of purposive and snowball sampling. This is clearly stated in the methods section, so I struggle to see how there could be any confusion. 2. ‘The report claims that researchers uncovered “near universal” Bougainvillean opposition to reopening of the mine’. Once again this is incorrect. What the report actually says is that those interviewed expressed near universal opposition. This is a very different assertion indeed, and bares no relation whatsoever to the much grander claims being imputed by Wallis. 3. ‘Unusually, the specific interview questions are not provided, so there is no way to verify whether they were leading or whether the potential bias of the researchers was influential’. First, I would question the premise of this critique. Is this unusual? Many NGO reports, and studies published in scholarly journals, exclude interview questions for a range of good reasons. I can cite many such reports, and would be happy to if needed. This flawed premise aside, the Jubilee study employed semi-structured interviews. The advantage is that this type of interview method allows key themes to be discussed, but in a way where the conversation can assume an organic form. Key research questions/themes were included on p.50. However, inevitably, as it says on the tin, every semi-structured interview contains its own nuance that will depart from the other interviews. So invariably no one interview will conform exactly to the transcript of questions. 4. 'The report is critical of the ABG, yet there appears to have been little attempt to interview or obtain relevant documents from the ABG’. The report relays views from the 82 participants, some of these accounts are critical in part of the ABG. However, it must be noted that that the study’s objective was to inquire into the perception and experience of participants ; it did not attempt to adjudicate on fact. It is unfair, therefore, to judge the report’s content by a yard stick that is entirely inappropriate. The same critique might be levelled at the following observation by Wallis: ‘the report claims that respondents identified that “there exist many other promising economic activities that could represent a solid source of revenue”. There is no detailed attempt to examine the potential and limitations of these alternatives’. Once again the report explored experience and perception; it was simply outside the terms of reference to deliberate on important issues like alternative development models. It is hardly fair to critique a report, for not being able to resolve all the questions under the sun in one sitting. 5. ‘The achievements of the Bougainville parties and the Papua New Guinea government in negotiating a comprehensive peace agreement, creating the Autonomous Bougainville Government (ABG) and avoiding a large-scale resumption of conflict should be acknowledged. Important to this has been the sophistication and restraint of Bougainvillean leaders, and the strength and resilience of the Bougainville people. Bougainvilleans’ strong tradition of reconciliation has also resolved many (but not all) tensions and done much to bridge societal divisions. Yet this is not a picture presented by the report’. Actually, the report explicitly acknowledges these praiseworthy efforts. It also points to areas still in need of redress. See p.12 ‘The innovative synthesis of top-down and bottom up measures has been widely praised in the peacebuilding literature. However, the latter research suggests some caution still needs to be exercised when gauging the effectiveness of the peace process on Bougainville’. 6. ‘The report highlights the dangers of development NGOs sacrificing accuracy for advocacy. It appears that Jubilee Australia has uncritically accepted that the anti-mining voices of a small number of interview respondents represent those of all Bougainvilleans, perhaps because its mandate is premised on the assumption that mining activities will have an adverse impact’. First, this criticism might be inverted, and instead it could be argued that the author has uncritically accepted the critique of President Momis, without examining the report to see whether indeed this very public criticism actually has any basis in fact. I struggle to find any other explanation, given how explicit the report was on its methods, objective, and limitations. Second, the accusation that the research team had a prior mandate which it subsequently attempted to achieve through massaging its findings, is arguably one of the most serious accusations to make. It is startling the author has made such a red-button criticism without forwarding any evidence. To conclude. The issues raised in this report about trauma, marginalisation, heritage, land transition and future, are important. I found the data confronting, and fascinating. Bougainville is a wonderfully rich place with many conversations going on. This report captures one window into this frenetic, complex conversation, many others exist and should be explored using a range of methods. And I would genuinely like to see dialogue with the ABG on the report's findings, take a less polarising form. I have a deep admiration for the achievements of Bougainville, they have a remarkable story to tell. And sometimes some of these stories will have critical edges to them, but if we can accept that there is a place for critical thought, then this can only create a more diverse conversation in the long run which will enrich the future. I also appreciate the time taken by Wallis to critique the report. However, while scholarly critique is absolutely vital, it strikes me as equally vital that research is judged according to its stated objectives, methods and limits, and not against imagined methods or limits imputed on it by critics.

APTC has been in competition with local education institutes in Fiji, Samoa and PNG with fee paying students at Ok Tedi Mining, in open competition with other institutes in Australia with same qualification standards. In some instances, building new resources and training being offered to scholarship students having better standards of accommodation and equipment in close proximity and competing with local fee-paying apprentices. Australian licensing requirements for most apprentices/tradespeople require a level of Australian experience. The money would be better spent helping local training colleges or institutes. People are taken away from their jobs to undertake training, learning new systems and then trying to reintegrate in to their old life that is still using old systems. This is destroying long relationships with family and promoting unrealistic goals.

Thanks for this post Robin. It would be interesting to know what the implications are for Nauru in this, given the economic impact that the Regional Processing Centre has had in recent times. And in that vein, I would argue that the lack of leverage was (and is) indeed significant in the case of Nauru - as discussed <a href="https://devpolicy.org/the-pacific-solution-and-naurus-coup-by-stealth-20140123/" rel="nofollow">here</a> and <a href="http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2014/03/21/Deafening-silence-on-rule-of-law-in-Nauru.aspx" rel="nofollow">here</a>, Australia declined to make any meaningful comment when David Adeang decided to do away with the rule of law.

Hi Mark Appreciate the comments. Agree that the central bank limited the chance for arbitrage by constraining the amount of foreign exchange reserves available at the official rate to around K60 million every fortnight- otherwise PNG's foreign reserves would have dropped much more quickly. The comment about the arbitrage possibility was aimed at highlighting the gap was unsustainable. As you mention, the better option would have been to tender the intervention. Your last para mentions the possible budgetary impacts of these changes. I considered including some reference to these in the article - but my sense was that they were unknown and possibly largely offsetting. So as you point out, the cost of the Government's intended infrastructure spend would have been considerably more at the pre-June 4 rates. Likewise, the appreciation lowers the Kina cost of repaying international loans - including the loan to purchase the Government's share in Oil Search. On the other side of the coin, tax revenues could fall because exporter incomes are lower and hence mineral tax and company tax collections are lower in Kina terms (many of the larger miners operate their accounts in US dollars). My sense was that there were a range of positive and negative effects on the budget from the change and it was hard to determine the overall impact. At the same time, there may be other budgetary risks if the change in policy has discouraged foreign investment (and hence future tax revenues or the price of any asset sales) or increased the size of the sovereign risk (and hence costs) associated with any possible future external borrowings. Once again, appreciate the comments.

I was one of the few Australians in the audience in New York at the launch last week. It was pleasing to see Australia, the Foreign Minister and DFAT visible, and positively so. It seems clear to me that whatever else is done re the Innovation Hub investments, Australia needs to be more visible in global fora. The week prior in DC at the USAID Frontiers in Development two-day event, Australia was noticeably absent yet our content and contribution to the global debate could at worst be equal. I am enthused Australia is contributing. I am optimistic we will also create a space of leadership through our 'new aid paradigm'.

Hi Stephen. I think the pilot idea is a step in the right direction. While there is no standard visa pathway, this can be created easily enough via employer sponsored visas and it wouldn't require any migration reform (a mechanism called labour agreements using 457 visas). Further, it's like the new migration agreements announced for Darwin will include general aged care workers, not just nurses. I believe this skill level and occupation in migration programs will be required into the future and you'll see an expansion of this "semi-skilled" occupation eligibility. I also think it's probably a good idea to start in Tonga. This appears hard enough and being located in Tonga reduces one of the major risks, matching up migrants and employers. Hopefully over time, if the pilot succeeds, it can expand with some additional emphasis on that matching process which has failed to date in the SWP. I wrote about some of the migration opportunities in response to your paper <a href="http://henrysherrell.wordpress.com/2014/05/26/generating-skilled-migration-the-australian-pacific-technical-college-and-labour-mobility/" rel="nofollow">on my blog</a>. I'm optimistic given this type of labour is very different to unskilled labour which backpackers do and employers get a lot out of a more permanent relationship. We already see it at the trades-level via the substantial number of Filipino 457 visa holders in Australia. Incidentally, I know the IOM here in Dili are currently writing a National Action Plan for labour mobility so this is obviously a major topic of interest for a range of countries in the region. Cheers Henry

In Tonga last week I was struck by the number of taxi drivers who had participated in the SWP. About half of the 16 or so drivers I met had gone to Australia under the scheme (to a range of places - Griffith and Mildura were mentioned several times). All lived in Nuku'alofa, all spoke highly of the experience, and all planned to return.

Thanks for this post Stephen, I think it raises some important points and illustrates the need to think about 'joining up' initiatives with what's going on in numerous environments. One additional point is that a primary reason for APTC adopting the 'top up' approach to provision of training is to the political ramifications of competing with national VET institutions that offer qualifications up to Cert II. And by upskilling those already in industry it avoids creating a glut of people with qualifications that can't get jobs in those areas where the private sector is too small to employ them all. The Tonga initiative is interesting on numerous levels, not least why it is that Tonga seems to be the 'preferred supplier' when it comes to new labour mobility initiatives from Australia. If, as you and Jonathan have written elsewhere, it is the case that labour mobility options are more important for the countries of Melanesia surely we would expect to see an initiative similar to this one in this part of the Pacific some time soon.

Have there been any studies benchmarking humanitarian in-kind aid against humanitarian direct cash transfers (at diff levels)? I'd be keen to see that. R

EA, you make some reasonable points. But it seems to me that for many IFC technical assistance programs that are donor-funded, the organisation's main focus is on satisfying donors rather than its local government or business clients. IFC's status as a multi-lateral agency also gives it some prestige and, I suspect, immunity from the more immediate consequences a private consulting firm might suffer if it failed to deliver reasonable outcomes for its clients. Nonetheless I agree with your point that IFC may have a different kind of skin in the game than a private sector organisation.

Joel, Thanks for the comment, and query. I've got several responses. First, we know that several hundred dollars have been set aside in this year's budget (see our budget analysis from earlier in the year), so there would be no problem finding more humanitarian aid this year. Second, longer-term, we should in my view be looking to make our aid program more focused on disasters and humanitarian responses. I don't have many sectoral or country preferences, but this would be one. We know it is an area where aid generally works, and it is underfunded, and there is strong public support. We're not going to be able to give large amounts to Indonesia indefinitely. I would be looking to the humanitarian budget to soak up the excess. In twenty years time, we might have a very small aid program to Indonesia, but we should still have a very large (and much larger than currently) humanitarian aid budget. Third, I do view humanitarian aid as a benchmark for all aid, or even for all government spending. Of course it would be great if we could actually help societies develop, but let's face it, we're often not very good at it. I think it would be useful if we always asked of any proposed expenditure: is my $x million of TA/capacity building/system strengthening/scholarships/research worth more than $x million of humanitarian aid. It's a difficult question to answer, but a useful one to ask. Regards, Stephen.