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From Peter Graves on Malcolm Turnbull on international development
Apologies - I missed <a href="https://devpolicy.org/in-brief/international-development-and-pacific-elevated-in-turnbull-reshuffle-20150920/" rel="nofollow">Ashlee Betteridge's comments</a> of yesterday. But I have to disagree with Minister Bishop supposed interest in foreign aid. Vide the reductions in aid to Afghanistan, when so many Afghans are fleeing the country - <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/14/world/asia/for-14-50-a-desperate-bet-by-afghan-refugees-on-a-way-out.html?_r=0" rel="nofollow">to Europe in this case</a> (as Australia has made it so plain that we will not facilitate them to this country)
The second reference doesn't appear to made the Australian media and makes interesting reading about the <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/11/world/asia/afghans-see-american-general-as-crucial-to-countrys-defense.html" rel="nofollow">continuing direct influence of the US military on the Afghan forces</a>. Compare with our claims about training Afghan troops.
From Peter Graves on Malcolm Turnbull on international development
So - any comments about what seems a significant step forward in the Foreign Affairs Portfolio ? There is now a Minister for International Development and the Pacific (Steve Ciobo) - back to the days of Gordon Bilney ?
Given the abuse of AusAID and the Treasurer treating the foreign aid budget as just another expense to be reduced, this at least treats “aid” as worthy of a Minister in its own right.
Best evidence on previous levels on non-interest ? The reduction in aid to Afghanistan: from $148.4M in 2013-14 to $81.7M in 2015-16. This is not maintaining the commitment to that country so loudly proclaimed by Minister Bishop.
Reactions from the experts ?
From Daniel DAI on Thomas Webster on visas, Porgera, PNG elections and the resource boom
thanh you Mr Thomas Wbster for the great research you have done on the issues concerning locals benefiting from those mines in PNG. I found it very vital informtion in a research paper I wrote at Unitech for acedemic purposes.
From Alastair Wilkinson on UN population projections: implications for international development
Good thing UNFPA Pacific has been trying to persuade countries to take population growth (and associated issues, especially SRH) seriously. Population policies developed in Vanuatu and Tuvalu recently and currently working on Samoa (as I speak - first policy workshop happening in the Ministry of Finance Planning Div on Tuesday this week) and Solomons. We started n Fiji last year but then the elections came along and some how they've lost interest/dropped the ball, not sure which or whether it's because UNFPA hasn't been pushing this along with the government.
From Lauchlan T. Munro on AIIB: much ado about very little
What is really astonishing about this article is how the author gets all the facts rights but still misses the point. He says in passing that “the Chinese would like to play a bigger role on the Asian and world stage, and they feel rebuffed from doing so at the IMF and the World Bank by the U.S. Congress”. After similar remarks about China and the ADB, he says that “But it is hard to see this as the true story” and that what the “Chinese are merely putting down a “marker” with the AIIB”.
The issue is not that the Chinese are “merely” putting down a marker. They are putting down a very big, multi-billion dollar marker and telling the whole world about it. They are peeved about being told for decades that their nationals can have any job at the World Bank except the most important job. They are peeved that China is the number three shareholder in ADB, though they have the biggest population and the biggest economy in Asia by far. And so, while not abandoning those older organisations, the Chinese have decided to build their own one, one where they set the rules. In diplomacy, putting down such a marker can never be dismissed with the word “merely”.
I am further surprised that the author seems to think that the AIIB is the only strand of China’s strategy. (“It is most interesting that the Chinese have chosen the vehicle of a development bank as their instrument.”). The AIIB is far from being China's only instrument in their effort "to play a bigger role on the Asian and world stage". But so is the other New Development Bank (formerly ‘the BRICS Bank’), and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, along with Chinese bilateral diplomacy and investment. These all have to be seen as part of the same Chinese strategy.
The real fact of the matter is that China is now a top-flight world power who feels that it has long been treated as a second- (or even third-) class world citizen. And they are determined to change that. That is "the true story"; pity that Bestani cannot see that.
From Phil Withnell on Vilu War Museum: tourism in Solomon Islands
Great read Matt, very insightful and moving.
Thanks for taking the time to write this one up. I have an interest in this and this blog is the best info I have found so far on this museum.
Now I understand why it is so hard to find anything about the museum.
I hope that I might be able to help in some small way through my company to assist the upkeep of this important collection.
Cheers - Phil
From Robin Davies on Two dogmas of development financing: aid floors for the bottom billions
On the stinginess point, yes, I agree the floor levels, especially for LDCs, are very unlikely to be adequate if treated literally as targets, even if one assumes maximum efficiency in delivery and a totally rational allocation of dollars to purposes. However, I think the aid volume risks are on the downside even if their realisation has been prematurely pronounced. A commitment to at least maintain per-capita aid at, or a bit above, current levels for these two groups of countries would have real bite, while not being so unrealistic that donors would find it necessary to post-date it to the year 3000. And it would not be incompatible with more traditional, medium- to long-term ODA/GNI target setting.
Part of what makes the aid floors idea relatively realistic is that it does not bind individual donors but only the collective. As you say, this might be thought to reduce its immediate motivational force for the average individual donor. But, by the same token, the collective nature of the commitment makes it easier to swallow, and it can subsequently be used to assess individual performance in terms of the contribution that a given donor is making to the satisfaction of the collective commitment. Also, there's no reason why all contributions should be exactly equal, or rather proportional to GNI, because donors have different partner sets, and will sometimes be genuinely hard-up for a few years.
The idea is similar to that underlying the commitment to mobilise $100 billion per annum annually for climate change financing from 2020 on, except that in this case we are talking only about public money. A smaller example is the G20 commitment to maintain aid-for-trade funding at no less than 2011 levels.
From Robin Davies on Malcolm Turnbull on international development
I wouldn't venture a guess as to election timing, though several commentators seem to think Turnbull would rather cement his authority for a while rather than immediately questioning his own legitimacy by calling an early poll.
That aside, it's clear that an change of Coalition policy on aid volume -- to avoid the 'captain's call' problem -- will have to be achieved through the 2016-17 budget process, which means slowly and non-publicly. Turnbull's response to Plibersek's recent question in parliament (which she described as an instance of 'mansplaining') confirms this.
That doesn't mean that policy can't and won't be changed, though. A start would be the cancellation of the planned further reduction of $350 million in 2016-17, on top of the $1 billion cut in 2015-16. It would also be desirable to place a reasonable cap on the amount of money to be taken from the aid program to meet costs associated with the acceptance of 12,000 refugees from Syria and Iraq, given that a substantial proportion of these costs (totalling $700 million over four years) will be ODA-elgible. Australia's decision to pay a high price for membership of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank will already place some pressure on a pulverised aid budget.
By the way, Plibersek's question might have carried more force if Labor itself were able to say something about its policy on aid volume. I assume that, if pressed, their line would be, 'we'll have to look at the books after we're elected'. Some kind of a commitment on the Labor side would perhaps strengthen Julie Bishop's hand in arguing for stabilisation or restoration of the aid budget.
From Lenard Milich on Not such a bad project after all? A new report on KFCP
No, not such a bad project after all - see the <a href="http://www.forda-mof.org/index.php/content/publikasi/post/391" rel="nofollow">socio-economic impact assessment</a> I authored. Just one that ended prematurely - by about 5 years. Yes, it took them a long time to get off the ground because they sought full consensus. Yes, it was never perfect - but then who ever said that social engineering is simple? Yes, it failed to block canals, and even the small tatas that it did block are not blocked durably - see one of the photos in my report. But it profoundly changed the mindset of many of the people in the 14 villages in its operational area, such that forest conservation and antipathy to fire are now dominant themes.
Lessons were being learned throughout. They could not be implemented because the project was killed. Which is more than just "too bad" - it's a missed opportunity of colossal proportions. In the end, KFCP was demonstrating how things SHOULD be done, if done properly, and that it takes much, much longer to achieve goals than the short timeframes conceived by the architects of most development project.
As for the NGO opposition - it's risible. As an example, YPD fomented unrest in the villages through dissimulation - the mantir adat signatures on an anti-KFCP document were total fabrications, for example. In a reasonable response, the mantirs should have taken the head of YPD to court - but to avoid conflict, they opted not to, instead keeping their anger against him purely internal. This head of YPD subsequently used his notoriety to run for election in the local parliament - I'm happy to report that he hoodwinked few people, ultimately, and lost. Take-home message to you: don't accept anything in Indonesia at face value; spend time on-the-ground locally, and speak to those involved.
From Setaita Tamanikaiyaroi on The Rugby World Cup – lessons for development
This article provides an interesting analogy. Our soccer fans may think otherwise.
So, when we watch the world cup for the next two months do so from a Development perspective.
From Eddie Sarufa on Service delivery realities in Gulf Province, PNG
Ye it is very true. Gulf really went back in the 1990s, I use to be a teacher in Kaintiba are, we had all teachers from PNG. Pay is to e deleivered by pay run charters to small airstrips. and we would be there to collect them. then back to our schools. during the hoildays we floold in to kerema town show of strenght, of who were serving in the bush of gulf.
Service delivery since, we realised were begining to cease, when Bosses in Kerema Began making their bases in Port moresby. Most of us transferd out, and made our way to positions of importance. if we were in Kerema we wouldn't.
But now we are more than prepared to work with teams in Kerema, just open your doors. The province is in better positions to make it work. Just get the plans in order.,
From Camilla Burkot on Malcolm Turnbull on international development