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Hi, we are Fight COVID Taiwan and we built a website documenting English version of Taiwan's CDC guideline and some experiences. Hope it would be helpful! https://fightcovid.edu.tw/

Very concise feature on the natural need to trade when cash dries up. It will be interesting to see if the connections and trust made between businesses continues if, and when, things get back to normal

To support Sarah Garap in relation to native NGOs lack support is true. In fact registered an NGO and was trained by NCD Police Command, and other International NGO, to mitigate Domestic Violence. We have been very successful, effective in apprehending the perpetrators and detained them at nearest police station, Waigani. As a result many of the men folks have changed since our inception. As to no support, we have reduced our operations. DAFT should verify and assist genuine native NGOs.

Thanks brother. A great read, well planned and informatively executed. In a culture and system where payback killing and revenge and wantok system deeply rooted can certainly not withstand the death penalty policy. If executed would be a clear sign of civil war erupting almost everyday everywhere.

That's a very powerful piece of work written by Michael, thanks. I as a student I can now know and differentiate the alternatives over the political stability and instability for the past years gone.

Great! Congratulatuons to team.

Great Job!

Hi Paul, As I've noted a ‘boom’ is not just a product of the percentage of the spending allocated to all anticorruption organisations. We do not narrowly define it as such, as I've mentioned. Apologies if this is how it comes across in the blog. The boom includes setting up of taskforce, allocations, funding to key anticorruption organisations. etc. The graph above is only a part of the story - which shows the significant rise of allocations. A key question about capacity is whether the O'Neill government inherited a set of organisations with the capacity to spend their allocations. This is an open question, which the O’Neill government would probably say no, while others will disagree. Arguably, any government has a better chance of shaping that capacity and the ability to absorb funding allocations over time. Still, this is an interesting line of enquiry that deserves more research. In our paper we give the O’Neill government (as we would the Marape government) the benefit of the doubt while noting the problems associated with underspending. I suggest you read the full paper. Best, Grant

Hi Grant Thanks for the response. On the evidence of actual practice - the criteria of backing up with 'cold hard Kina' you mention - there was no boom. The anti-corruption expenditure share of the budget fell in the first three years of the O'Neill government. By 2017, it had been cut by over a third. 'A lack of capacity' to deliver on 'political will' is not an issue here - higher shares were actually expended in both 2009 and 2011. So the O'Neill government early years appear to be very big on promises while actually cutting expenditure despite the capacity being present. Is this a boom? Not when tracing the 'cold hard Kina' trail. And is it a basis for saying the new Marape government is demonstrating less of a commitment? Maybe the 10% increase (from 0.3 to 0.33%) is just more realistic? Another interesting comparison will be the current UBS Inquiry and how it goes relative to the abandoned UBS Leadership Tribunal inquiry (and subsequent moves in senior personnel). With respect Paul

Hi Paul, Thanks for your comments. You are right, the graph presented in the blog shows that as a percentage of the budget spending reduces slightly during the O’Neill government’s first years in office. However, as you will see in the full paper, spending increased for key anticorruption agencies – the Auditor General’s Office and Ombudsman for example. Still, I think it is important to pay attention to allocations as a key indicator of a ‘boom’ for a few reasons. First, as we note in the paper, underspending can be a function of a lack of capacity as much as political will. Second, as you note we have not seen the actuals for the Marape period which means we cannot compare spending for these two governments. Third, allocations are one (but certainly not only) indication of intent (even if not followed through) and generally get the lion’s share of attention from media and policymakers. Having said this, in the paper and elsewhere - https://devpolicy.org/anti-corruption-and-the-2018-png-budget-20180214/ – we do examine the problem with the gap between allocations and spending. The O’Neill government did not get the ICAC bill through two Parliamentary readings, but did lay the legal groundwork for the ICAC. In the full paper, we note that the Marape has taken a number of positive anti-corruption measures. For example, the government has commissioned an inquiry into the UBS loan scandal, and appointed anti‐corruption activist MP Bryan Kramer as minister of the country's police force. We also note that O’Neill also set up Taskforce Sweep in his government’s first year, which was initially successful in investigating corruption. Taskforce Sweep was lauded at the time (a part of the boom period) before it was defunded (as a part of the ‘bust’). Will we see the same dynamic with the new Marape government? Too early to tell, but our analysis and that from elsewhere suggests policymakers and others should be looking out for a bust and be ready to respond to it if/when it comes. Best, Grant

This was an unprecedented situation created by the pandemic. Hence, at least some form of rescue agreements should be drafted by Australia and participating countries for incentives instead of giving more responsibility to Australia. For any emergency for that matter.

Spot on, David.