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I think it is necessary to reference the increased significance that this issue received at last years meeting of the Pacific Islands Forum leaders. Whether this momentum can be maintained or built upon remains to be seen but it is a significant element in a regional discussion of this sort: https://devpolicy.org/trying-times-in-tuvalu-20190820/

The Real History - and solution During the 1950s two groups wanted West Papua, American businessmen wanted its mineral wealth which they could not risk getting a Dutch or Papuan mining license for (i.e. they needed Indonesia to capture the territory to obtain a reliable and favourable license), and President Sukarno who wanted the lands and was already using West Papua as political diversion to blame ongoing poverty and corruption on the Dutch rather than his own administration and military. And in May 1959 friends of Freeport mining proposed an illegal use of the International Trusteeship System (Charter of the United Nations chapter XII) a scheme which would use "a special United Nations trusteeship over the territory for a limited number of years, at the end of which time sovereignty would be turned over to Indonesia" - ref https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v17/d203 In late 1960 after the Australian and Malaysian governments refused to take part as the 'temporary' administrator responsible for asking Indonesia to then assume administration, it was decided that the United Nations itself would have to act as the 'temporary' administrator that would ask West Papua's traditional enemy Java to assume administration. Making matters worse the Americans elected a John F. Kennedy who had had personal experience with the Melanesian of the Solomons during the Pacific and throughout 1961 Kennedy would not authorise the proposed acheme. None the less somebody, no doubt other friends of Freeport, told Indonesia of the proposal and by March 1961 Indonesian officials said they liked the plan so long as nobody called the trusteeship a trusteeship, ref https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v23/d150 For the UN trusteeship or 'New York Agreement' to function as a defacto contract of sale selling the Papuan population to Indonesia it was neccessary to conceal the agreement and UN authorisation from the Trusteeship Council, and to ensure the UN Secretiat would ignore article 85(2) of the Charter of the United Nations which creates a legal obligation for the UN and its members to ensure news of agreement such as the 1962 'New York Agreement' which creates a trustee obligation is reported to the agenda of the Trusteeship Council. The problem in 1961 was that Dag Hammarskjold was the UN Secretary General and was opposed to colonial oppression. However Sukarno had two close allies a Burmese diplomat U Thant and India's PM Nehru who had become friends during the 1955 Bandung Conferrence the first time that Sukarno attempted to get African votes to support his demands in the General Assembly for possession of West Papua. Burma has a sufficent issue with 'separatists' (populations who have never consented to be part of Burma) as did India and Indonesia but India and Indonesia also had additional territories they wanted to capture if the UN could be silenced. Dag Hammarskjold's term was due to end at the start of 1963 and in 1961 the presumptive next Seretary General was Mongi Slim of Tunsia who in 1961 was standing for position as the 1961 General Assembly Preisdent, and Indonesia was providing the only alternative President candidate. Two weeks before the 1961 General Assembly, Sukarno and Nehru cosponsored a Non-Aligned governments meeting at it was proposed that U Thant should be the next UN Secretary General, and Indonesian two days before the Assembly announced it was withdrawing its candidacy thereby forcing Mongi Slim to accept the position as President when the world heard of Hammarskjold's death on morning of the 1961 General Assembly and Indonesia procedured to withdraw its candidacy. With SLim unable to be nominated, and with Non-Aligned support the pro-Soviet U Thant became the new UN Secretary General. Also with Non-Aligned support a Security Council resolution authorised UN military action on behalf of the Congo government against the Katanga Republic that had declared independence, then India invaded Goa and Daman & Diu, and Indonesia invaded West Papua. Indonesia had invaded West Papua several times during the 1950s and during 1962 the Indonesian soldiers were arrested again awaiting deportation, but the new UN Secretary General asked America and others to help Indonesia get the Dutch to sign the 'New York Agreement' that the Dutch had not known had been previously negotiated during 1961. The Dutch signed the agreement on 15 August 1962 and the UN Secretary General U Thant publicly endorsed the proposal that asks our governments to authorise United Nations occupation & subjugation of West Papua, and includes a clear intent to then allow Indonesia to assume administration without UN supervision. Technically the 'New York Agreement' is legal complying with Chapter XII of the Charter of the United Nations although in apparant violation of article 1. Normally a General Assembly resolution must be provided at least 30 days before the vote; but on 19th September 1962 the Assembly was given two days notice that they were to address the matter on Friday afternoon 21st Sept 1962. Then on Friday afternoon, with U Thant personally attending watching members vote, the President of the 1962 Assembly told our governments to vote WITHOUT debate whether to authorise or oppose the new Secretary General's plan for West Papua. As the UN Secretary General controls which items are on the agenda and in which order of all Security Council and other UN meetings, no nations wishes to offend or insult the Secretary General. In other words, our governments were being blackmailed to vote yes for UN General Assembly resolution 1752 (XVII) that is authorising today's ongoing occupation & subjugation of West Papua. The only illegal aspect is that the UN issue of resolution.1752 has still not been placed on the agenda of the Trusteship Council, and therefore the Council can not commence the yearly UN reports (Charter article 88) about West Papua's progress towards "self-government or independence" (Charter article 76(b)). Our government and every UN member as well as the current Secretary General have a legal obligation to place news of the UN invasion of West Papua and its authorisation General Assembly resolution 1752 (XVII) on the Trusteeship Council's agenda without further delay. Please refer to our paper and some other historical links at https://wpik.org/a

Thank you very much Dr Armin Bauer for your feedback. Great to know that we share most of the suggestions. Grateful if you can share more information on your research in Vietnam. I will email you directly for the exchange. Cheers

I was in the Solomon Islands in March/April 1986 working on a rice project at SolRice. My wife and I were given a pick-up truck for getting around. We went one weekend to the Vilu War Museum. In those less troubled times I had no problem following signs and finding the museum. I have beautiful memories of this museum set in the middle of nowhere. The fact that Mags and I were the only visitors added to the atmosphere. For some reason we had the whole place to ourselves. We didn't see another living soul, still less the curators. Some years later I settled in Thailand and have visited the Bridge on the River Kwai and its associated war museums many times. With the throngs of tourists at the River Kwai I can safely that Vilu was far more poignant and atmospheric in its sad depiction of what the war was about on Guadalcanal.

Dear Tim. I fully agree that in developing Asia SMEs have structural weaknesses with productivity, not being able to pay high wages etc. Most IBs are actually innovative, commercially viable, dynamic medium-sized enterprises where the management is interested in finding solutions for the B40 which also make business sense. There are not so many IBs worldwide and in Asia, in our studies we typically find maybe 20-100 per country. but the number is increasing. Anyway, the number of companies and their sizes (IB can be small companies, medium sized, large, national or international companies) does not matter for the IB discussion, rather their transformative and systemic character of impact. And systemic change needs also some size and some commercial sustainability; in result, most IB are medium-sized firms. I am currently writing a more elaborated reply to the original blog. If you wish a copy let me know through email. Armin BAUER

Dear Ms. Nguyen Phuong and Mr. Alice Behan. A friend of mine sent me your blog, which I found quite interesting. As the former head of ADB's Inclusive Business initiative and having done in the last 3 years various policy studies and strategies on IB (also recently in Viet Nam), I'd like to respond to some of your points. I therefore wrote a more elaborated reply of which my main points are below. I am sure we share most of suggestions, and I would be happy to exchange more with you. Can you share your email address with me so that I can send you the text. Let's keep the exchange floating; the topic is so important. I am happy to share some information on the Viet Nam study I did by the way the company you refer to is an IB and if the government establishes some of the support policies we discussed that company will be included). I am happy to share also more information on Viet Nam. (and other countries). Thanks and best wishes. Dr. Armin BAUER (former head of ADB's inclusive business initiative) 1) IBs not defined by size but by systemic impact on the poor. 2) Smaller companies (and also social enterprises) can be IB. 3) Proposed IB support mechanisms - once set up are for smaller companies also. 4) In agribusiness not the employment size matters but the number of people for whom the company creates income opportunities above the market rate through their value chain. 5) IB accreditation is the best way for government and business association to ensure transparent selection of IB and targeting support mechanism to the private sector. 6) IB promotion must go beyond SME support policies. 7) Only a few incentives are relevant and access to funding is not the main problem. 8) Various countries (and their their governments and business associations) in ASEAN see the triple win opportunities of IB (for the poor, for society, for business) and now come up with IB support strategies. and programs. This needs to be further encouraged. 9) COVID 19 is a window of opportunity not to build back better but to transform some mainstream businesses and NGO-driven social enterprises into IB business models, initiatives and activities that serve in a more relevant way the BoP/B40 income groups. 10) But while more IBs are important for development, IB will not become (and does not need to) the new normal of private sector investments; it is one type of business, and others are also important.

Thank you for giving space to honor a woman leader whose shoulder we Papua New Guinea woman stand on today. Late Mama Nahau as we call her was our trail blazer who inspired and mentored many of us who are trying our best to advocate for gender equality in PNG. I wish to express my sincere condolences to her daughter Michelle who I have worked with in the UN in PNG for 4 years. I am thinking of her and her siblings, children, extended family members and the people of Manus at this difficult time.

Thank you very much for your comments, Tim. I agree that it is important to take systemic approach to address the "root causes" of underperformance in the sector. That's is exactly the approach that the GREAT program is taking. The purpose of the article is to critique the approach to supporting only medium and large businesses and excluding micro and small businesses, which also have great potential for creating jobs and providing better incomes for the poor. As such, we did not mention other partnerships that the GREAT program is doing with NGOs and government agencies to address the issues as you mentioned. FYI, there are 50 partnerships under the GREAT progamme.

Thanks Writers (Chris), Bennie, Debbie, Charles & Priscilla). Firstly, this website is second to none from the perspective of community development. It's very helpful and contains invaluable information for community development workers and associates. The information contained on the site are easily accessible, easy to read and understand, and also practically usable. The piece of writing reading the training at Aiyura is insightful and great! For organizations such as the CIC, who directly works with farmer groups, the Aiyura training was very useful for the extension staff: many thanks to Chris and team CARE for delivering this important training. Confirm with your report that the training really filled in a missing gap between the extension officers normal way of extension (innovation driven) and the farmers (who have specific needs which are often overlooked); hence the gap. In the goings forwards of the CIC, especially in extension and training, under its (CIC) new strategic and business plans (2020 - 2030), obviously the new tools of CDW will be used. Looking forward to getting for updates and possibly make contributions. Especially to Chris, thanks for committing your life for community development in PNG.

I agree that a focus on direct engagement with inclusive businesses may leave others behind - especially SMEs that comprise large segments of the economies we work in, and where many of the poorest are active as suppliers, laborers and customers. However I do not think that a simple switch to working with SMEs provides an efficient, viable, and scalable solution. The example of GREAT more or less proves this: an AUD 34m program that has supported 17 of Vietnam's approximately half a million SMEs does not present a strong case. Rather, the answer lies in a more systemic approach that addresses underlying causes of underperformance in sectors in which SMEs are prevalent - be they policy or weaknesses in supporting functions and services such as finance, R&D, and adopting industry standards etc.

Thank you for this insightful and informative blog post. I appreciate the opportunity to learn about Ms Nahau Rooney, her achievements and her legacy. I wish to express my sincere, warm wishes to her many family members, including our ANU colleague Michelle, at this difficult time. Thank you again to the two authors for this valuable and important piece. Amanda

In recent years, thanks to ODE, program evaluations have regularly been published online (i.e. those commissioned by program areas and posts). For me personally that has meant having a clutch of recent evaluations published online having had none published by the Australian government since 1999! I now wonder if this commitment to publish will evaporate. Indeed I wonder about the fate of program evaluations more generally given that it was ODE that seemed to be able to apply effective pressure on program areas and posts to commission a minimum number of evaluations each year. Will we ever see another annual evaluation plan?