Comments

From Rajeev Jha on Remittances and aid in small states: the stability trap
Excellent paper, Sir. Very informative and useful for remittances and outmigration relationship and growth models.
From Godfrey Baldacchino on Remittances and aid in small states: the stability trap
A thought-provoking piece: thank you Drs Prasad and Ramachandram. I agree with all that has been argued. The economic-political nexus between remittances and aid in small states deserves deeper and wider research, at both household and national levels. Reference is made to the MIRAB model - MIgration, Remittances, Aid, Bureaucracy - which considers interactions between remittances and aid in an economic sense: this blog argues that their political interaction matters and remains understudied. What also needs to be studiesd is the transition away from MIRAB that is documented widely from small state development trajectories. Prasad and Ramachatman might give the impression that MIRAB 'locks' small states in a structural dependency from which there is no way out. However, the literature spawned by the MIRAB idea - which should be credited to Geoff Bertram as well as Roy Watters - suggests that there is a dynamism in the system, triggered by both opportunity and crisis - for small state scholars and practitioners, no surprise there. Tourism offers a way out of the impasse, generating a significant private sector response - and leading Jerome McElroy to propose the SITE (Small Island Deveoping State) acronym as a possible form of graduating from MIRAB. Then I contributed to the debate by proposing an even higher-order form of small island development, built on policy competences: People, Resource Management, Overseas Engagement, FInance and Transportation (PROFIT). Hence, we have a 3-way typology, with lots of oscillations happening to and fro. Let's keep the conversation going; but, more than that: I would really recommend some serious research on this pertinent topic.
From Shahida M Mohamed on Remittances and aid in small states: the stability trap
Appreciated this piece highlighting the paradox of remittances and aid in small states. A follow‑up focusing on practical pathways out of the “stability trap” with examples of domestic reforms, capacity‑building, and case studies would make the analysis even more actionable.
From Ryan Edwards on Remittances and aid in small states: the stability trap
This is, in my view, a more helpful way to think about remittances (cf., macro aid, etc) https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/dpr.12471 Open access via CGD website - Migration and Household Finance https://www.cgdev.org/publication/migration-strategy-household-finance-research-agenda-remittances-payments-and
From Peter Graves on Disappointing, predictable and surprising: Devpolicy’s latest aid opinion poll
Thanks Terence. I've just noticed this on the ABC's wesbite: https://www.abc.net.au/news/2026-07-28/new-lowy-pacific-aid-map-australia-lending-investor/106967764. "Australia has supplanted China as the dominant lender and infrastructure investor across the Pacific as the government ploughs billions of dollars into the region through both foreign aid and loans." Which again focusses on the input of "expenditure" (versus China). The survey lost an opportunity to present those findings to the general public and advise/inform/educate the public on the value of benefits to the recipients. Even if they might be prospective benefits.
From Michael Kabuni on PNG politics: highly fragmented but getting better
Thanks all. It will be interesting to see if this trend continues. Conventionally, few strong parties often develop around policy areas. What makes the low fragmentation (few big/strong parties) in PNG interesting is that it’s happening without clear ideological differences between parties, or sometimes parties with no policies at all. The traditional “charisma” argument has it’s limitations: Gary Juffa, for instance, one of the most charismatic leaders of this decade has not had more than one MP elected under his party in successive elections. Post-elections, his party numbers didn’t grow beyond himself. This is the same with Bryan Kramer. We will wait to see how Allan Bird fares in 2027 with a new party. One way to think about this phenomenon is that the State has increasingly become the major source of resource allocation to MPs. This takes the form of constituency development funds (DSIP/PSIP), the executive determining where donor funding goes, and ministerial allocation, among other things. Whilst the last point has always been there, the former two have become more important in recent decades. So as a MP, the question you ask is: how do I maximise my chances of accessing state resources? Do I remain independent, or as part of a small party? Or do I join one of the bigger parties and let the party negotiate, or negotiate as a member of a big party? The best option is of course the one: you improve your access to state resources, which is allegedly controlled by the prime minister. Big parties matter to the prime minister because he’s always under threat of a vote of no confidence. So joining one of the big parties makes you “visible” to the prime minister, and improves your access to state controlled resources. To remain a one man party, you need to be a Gary Juffa or Bryan Kramer. To remain independent, you have to be an Allan Bird. So charisma is still relevant because charismatic leaders can be visible without a big party. But charisma can no longer command a following, or maintain followers. The allocation of donor projects is an interesting thing to watch. The need for roads and bridges is common across PNG. But where exactly does the government direct donor assistance for bridges and roads? Does it go to opposition MPs or government MPs’ electorates? Does it go to single party MP’s electorate or electorates of one of the bigger parties?
From Russel Yangin on PNG politics: highly fragmented but getting better
Totally agree, Maho, if you can confirm the data, that would be very interesting. In my presentation and the blog Terence help to do up for ENP, I was tempted to put forward the impact of electoral change ( LPV) on party visibility togther with ENP as accessing and getting the appropriate data and calculating it is a bit difficult for me. My take is given 2027 election I hope you and Michael and Terence can confirm. I held the belief that incentives in the LPV together with Section 63 of OLLIPAC is having an impact on Party visibility. I really hope you continue this.
From Maho on PNG politics: highly fragmented but getting better
Thanks Domyal for your comment. Firstly, the ENP was calculated with the data that is available, election results which are thankfully available. Parliamentary MP party affiliation since 2017 is taken from the PNG MP Database. Second, you're right in that party loyalties do not stem from policy or ideology but rather from the charisma, resources, and popularity of party leaders. This makes PNG's party system weak and is an inherent feature of clientelist democracies, see here. It is difficult to measure the popularity of party leaders but we can infer this afterwards when MPs switch.
From Domyal on PNG politics: highly fragmented but getting better
Great Presentation! Just one thought here. The measuring model (ENP) of political fragmentation maybe limited in capturing key elements of PNG politics -election ENP and parliamentary seats ENP to project a weighting on fragmentation. Political fragmentation in PNG is dynamic over the last 15 years, never was it consistent or stable in party alignment by MPs after election. It may be different in comparison to other country’s ENP. It would be good to identify factors influencing the PNG political fragmentation. One view is that it is not driven by national development policy platforms, rather by individualism, for wealth and enterprise, through ethnic induced and regionalism practice. If ENP model can be flexible to accommodate or generate informative analysis on factors influencing fragmentation would be ideal.
From Maho on PNG politics: highly fragmented but getting better
Thanks Russel for your comment. Your blog (and UPNG presentation) was interesting. PNG's election outcomes had become increasingly fragmented leading into and including 2002, and I agree that this was likely a reason for inviting the largest party to form government - it's also why post-elections, the ruling party grows even larger as independents and small parties join it. Michael has written at length on this. I also think the fall in ENP since 2002 is an LPV effect reflecting the strategic voting on the part of voters. It is likely, generally, that while 1st preference votes reflect voters' "true" preference, 2nd and 3rd preferences are likely used to "hedge their bets" by voting for the candidate who is most likely to win. Competitive candidates are more often than not, members of large, strong parties. And as you know, most elections go into consecutive rounds, which favour the chances of these candidates, including an increase in incumbent success after leading on first preferences - this rose from 35% in 2007 to 63% in 2022. If this is true, I can certainly argue that it is, then the strategic voting brought about by the LPV system has made electoral and parliamentary politics less fragmented, something that Terence Wood, Michael and I missed in our discussion paper that reviewed the LPV system.
From Maho on PNG politics: highly fragmented but getting better
Thanks Ezra for your comment. You're correct in saying that the fortunes and decline of many (if not all) of PNG's successful parties have been dependent on big men, something studied at length by many political scientists in PNG. Paita is the most recent example. While the ways that parties are sustained has not changed, we demonstrate here that overtime, these "strong" parties have become fewer in number, attracted more MPs and smaller parties, and recent amendments to laws governing government change has led to their consolidation within parliament.
From Ezra Kelly on PNG politics: highly fragmented but getting better
Gentlemen, thanks for the write-up. It’s informative. I just want to share another perspective on winning parties. One or two parties that have changed leadership, especially Political wing, have seen increased winning numbers. A good example, Peoples First Party, stagnant for quite a while under late Governor for Morobe Luther Wenge, when the leadership changed to Richard Maru won couple of seats. PANGU’s resurrection came during the time of late Sam Basil. He maintained momentum for giving life to a party, did the same for ULP until his untimely passing. Not the same for PDM Paias Wingi held onto the leadership and once a powerful party now became nonexistent. PNG Party once had huge following under Sir Mek. Today it’s still struggling to go past 2 MPs. THE Party once powerhouse now probably has no political wing after Kandep MP defected to PANGU. When Parties changes leadership it produces different results. Just a suggestion, you could look at an article that assess the changes in leadership and its impact on winning candidates.
Subscribe to our newsletter