Comments

Good job Kerobin! We had very different experience but I do feel related. My parents never expected me to achieve anything through education (or any unconventional choices I've made) because they had little education. It is important to believe in yourself and keep working hard, and you will make it!

Thank you for your comments Professor Fraenkel, it is indeed a critical time for Vanuatu in the lead up to the first national referendum on the proposed Constitutional amendments. On the matter of versions: the blog links to the Vanuatu Parliament website for bills (as at the time), and the Vanuatu Ministry of Internal Affairs use the Facebook platform, both being official communication channels of the government - any difference in documents would need to be discussed directly with the government. Although passed by Parliament, with amendments made on the floor, the Bill has not yet been gazetted. There should soon be a consolidated "final version" that incorporates the amendments made on the floor of Parliament, and I suggest to keep tracking the official GoV sites.

There are two versions of the Vanuatu Political Parties Registration Bill floating around. The one referred to in this blog is different from the one on the Ministry of Internal Affairs website (dated 7.12.23). And the critical legislation is not in this bill at all. It is in the Constitutional Amendments 17A and 17B which try to bind MPs to their political parties (17A) and to require independents to affiliate with political parties (17B). These are to be put to a referendum in May 2024.

Thank you for the insight into our provincial economic growth and management..

Very good commentary

A very good piece

very informative.

Powerful Bro, very informative and thankyou.

I thank the authors for their blog posts on the subject of the ‘New Porgera’. In Part 2 the authors refer to the Free Prior and Informed Consent legal doctrine (FPIC) as relevant in the context of PNG and Porgera. This is both wrong and highly misleading. The FPIC doctrine is derived from the 'Awas Tingni'decision of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. The FPIC doctrine was taken up by a UN Rapporteur and incorporated within the UNDRIP, a non-legally binding agreement signed by 143 countries. Non-voting countries to the UNDRIP, neither voting against nor abstaining from voting, but absent from the vote included the Pacific island countries with traditional land tenure systems and laws; Fiji, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Nauru, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu and Vanuatu. Samoa abstained. While the FPIC doctrine has some significance in Latin American legal context, it is generally thought to have no relevance or significance in the legal systems of many Pacific island countries. The issues encompassed by the doctrine are more than adequately covered by local statutory, common and customary law. Banks and Burton appear to not understand the significance of the change in the legal arrangements and management structure for the Porgera mine. The previous Porgera mine arrangement took the form of an unincorporated joint venture (UJV – not a legal entity). The UJV subsisted in the agreements made between the parties and is not, in and of itself, capable of being owned. What is owned are the Licence concession shares. The UJV arrangement was created by those parties holding a share of the Porgera mining exploration concession. This is a State administered concession scheme that may lead to the creation and issuance of a special mining development licence. Such a Licence is awarded on the basis of proposals put forward by the concession-holders' nominated operator. The UJV has been a favoured vehicle in the mineral extraction industries for a very long time, perhaps centuries. The UJV parties, or co-venturers, contract not to be partners and to stand at arms length from each other. The elected, or nominated operator is chosen on the basis of technical expertise and is required to justify its mine operating costs to its co-venturers. Operating cost shares are deducted from the production share of each co-venturer. This structure guarantees transparency of mining costs. Where the government is a co-venturer and holds a share of the mining licence it gains not only revenue but also a transparent insight into the mine operating costs, and profits. This form of UJV has great flexibility. It enables mining companies who might be competing in one jurisdiction to cooperate in another and to meet or decline further calls for capital as the mine continues to develop. A UJV agreement typically provides that the licence parties owe no fiduciary duties to each other, liability is only ever several, never joint. The change to the New Porgera structure reverses many of the features of the UJV. The New Porgera arrangement takes the form of an incorporated joint venture (a legal entity). By making this arrangement the parties enter into a form of partnership. Liabilities become joint. Previously, under the UJV arrangements, if social issues impacted mine operations, Barrick as operator, had to petition the State. In the absence of a coherent State response Barrick was pressured by many of its critics to act as if it were the State. An incorporated joint venture, as a legal entity, may be answerable to a court. I expect that Barrick is hopeful that the new and transparent Porgera arrangements with the State as the dominant partner, will, over time, bring into being for Porgera a measure of the tranquility enjoyed by the Ok Tedi mine. It is odd that the blog authors reference the New Porgera arrangements to a New Caledonia example. The obvious comparisons are to be found with the successful Barrick mines in Tanzania and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Barrick has re-started The Reko Diq mining development in Pakistan. The proposed Reko Diq mining structure and arrangements are the same as for Porgera. Mark Bristow has a long history, beginning in Ghana, of promoting this form of state/miner arrangement. Barrick intends that the New Porgera mine will ramp up to become a Tier 1 mine. This is based on a detailed assessment and modelling of the mine and adjacent sites prospectivity. Previous production figures have no role to play in this assessment and for the blog authors to cite them as meaningful in this context is absurd. A 2023 study by K C Hill (et al), ‘Structural and Tectonic Evolution of the Porgera Gold Mine; Highlands of Papua New Guinea’ (https://www.mdpi.com/2076-3263/13/8/234) determined that- “[t]he Porgera deposit is a 974-metric ton Au, low sulfidation, alkali epithermal gold deposit ... the Porgera deposit is exceptional in containing a large zone of very high-grade, fault-controlled gold mineralization caused by efficient channelling of fluids up the fault zone that combined via flash-boiling during seismic fault events over an extended vertical range”. The study was funded by Barrick. Vailala

What an excellent story. I was a teacher in PNG in the days just before and after Independence, teaching in New Ireland, Manus, at Sogeri National High School and Popondetta. I have just retired after a long separate career in Community Engagement. I have maintained my interest in PNG through the years. I know the difficulties faced by sumatin from deep rural areas. It is heartening to hear Kerobin’s story. I wish him all success in his career.

Thank you Anderson for your comment. Indeed, safety is a serious concern in Port Moresby currently and needs collective actions from everyone (communities and the government)

Very informative articles published. I propose this article is useful for any research done so far on alarming rate of petty crime in the Nation's capital and other centers. This article should be collaborated for policy recommendations on combating crimes in cities and towns because the case is synonymous to other centers of the country.